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Wilhelm: Giving Public Opinion the Process That is Due: What the Supreme C

NOTE
GIVING PUBLIC OPINION THE PROCESS THAT IS
DUE: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT CAN LEARN
FROM ITS EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION

Justice David H. Souter announced his retirement from the
Supreme Court in April 2009, handing President Barack Obama his first
opportunity to shape the high court.' A month later President Obama
nominated Sonia Sotomayor to fill the open seat.2 During the
confirmation process, Republican opposition criticized Sotomayor for a
statement she made during a 2001 speech: "I would hope that a wise
Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often
than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived
that life."' Critics pointed to Sotomayor's remark as evidence of her
philosophical bias.4 Public dissemination of the statement created a
political backlash, which, while not in the magnitude of past
confirmation battles,5 caused headaches for the Obama administration.6

1. Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Souter Said to Have Plans to Leave Court in June: Obama
CouldFace Test on Shape ofJudiciary,N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at Al.
2. Shailagh Murray & Michael D. Shear, First Latina Picked for Supreme Court; GOP
FacesDelicate Task in Opposition, WASH. POST, May 27, 2009, at Al.
3. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002); see
also Bill Mears, High Marks for Sotomayor After Tough Questioning, CNN POLITICS, July 14,
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/14/sotomayor.hearing/index.html.
4. Peter Baker & Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Press Judge About Bias and Activism:
Sotomayor Pledges to Honor President-Retreatsfrom Some Statements, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2009, at Al. Not surprisingly, Sotomayor backpedaled from that statement during her Senate
confirmation hearings. See id.
5. See infra notes 21, 49-51 and accompanying text.
6. Posting of Jeff Zeleny to The Caucus: The Politics and Government Blog of the Times,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/white-house-judge-sotomayor-acknowledges-poorword-choice/ (May 29, 2009, 16:34 EST).
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That Sotomayor was even questioned about this statement
illustrates the modem politicization of judicial appointments. "The
judicial selection process and the federal judiciary itself both have long
histories of politicization. But the trend toward having the Senate
explicitly judge judicial nominees on the basis of their judicial
ideologies and philosophies is a relatively recent phenomenon."7 This
trend generated a Court defined by ideology rather than pure legal
philosophy; or, conversely, legal philosophy based on ideology. Thus,
this Note will argue that the politicization of judicial appointments
corresponds with an attendant politicization of judicial decision making,
particularly in highly controversial cases, such as those interpreting the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Significantly, "observers of the
Supreme Court generally have argued that membership change is the
primary source of change in collective voting behavior and case
outcomes." Because every Justice comes to the bench with inherent
biases,9 Justice Sotomayor's arrival on the bench will affect the political
undertones of the Court's legal analysis.10
This Note will further demonstrate that the modem Court, like
Congress and the executive, often responds to fluctuations in public
opinion when resolving political issues. While the Court justified
invocations of popular sentiment in Eighth Amendment analysis by
setting forth "evolving standards of decency," 1 the Court does not have
a comparable constitutional standard when deciding Fourteenth
Amendment cases. It is unlikely that the Justices can completely
discount public opinion, but they can-and should-provide a
constitutional justification for considering such political factors.
Our politicization story began fifty-five years ago when the
Supreme Court handed down a decision that shook the core of American
society and fundamentally recast its political and constitutional

7. Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 2168, 2182-83 (2006)
(citations omitted).

8. Lawrence Baum, Membership Change and Collective Voting Change in the United States
Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 3, 6 (1992). For example, "the rise in the Court's support for civil
liberties claims during the Warren Court and the subsequent decline in support during the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts have been ascribed primarily to Court appointments." Id.
9. See infra text accompanying note 109.
10. See Baum, supra note 8, at 5 (Voting behavior can be affected when "[o]ne or more
members leave the body and are replaced by members with different policy positions in the issue
area... . The positions of Supreme Court justices can be expected to reflect primarily the justices'
personal policy preferences, but these positions may be shaped by other forces such as the positions
of colleagues and perceptions of public opinion.").
I1. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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underpinnings.12 That electrifying decision, declaring "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal," 3 sparked public debate
not only on racial issues, but also on the role of the Court and its impact
on our everyday lives. The Court's intervention here did not come as a
surprise, as historically we have seen that "[t]here is virtually no political
question in the United States that does not sooner or later resolve itself
into a judicial question."l 4 Rather, as this Note will demonstrate, Brown
caused a political, social, and judicial upheaval. Once the Court began
intervening so directly into Americans' lives, politicians, interest groups,
and the public became more actively engaged in the judicial appointment
process, subjecting the Court to intense political pressures and creating
ideological tension among the Justices.' 5 "Swing" Justices, 16 who
already straddle the liberal-conservative divide, arguably feel these
pressures most acutely, which in politically volatile areas of law, such as
equal protection and substantive due process, engenders legal
uncertainty.
Part II of this Note will describe the politicization of the Supreme
Court and explain that the judicial appointment process has always been
political, but that the nature of the politics has changed. Part III will look
at the historical and modem role of public opinion in the Court's
decision making. Part IV will argue that swing Justices, who play the
decisive role in politically controversial cases, are the most attune to
fluctuations in public opinion. Part V will explore the dangers of explicit
judicial invocation of, and implicit reliance on, public opinion when
deciding divisive Fourteenth Amendment issues without a clear
12. See Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 18, 18-19 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) ("[T]he unanimous decision delivered
on May 17, 1954, immediately captured the attention of elected officials, legal commentators, and
ordinary citizens alike. Everyone understood that the Court was committing the nation to a new and
historic course when it ... ruled segregation in the public schools unconstitutional.").
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
14.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 310 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,

2004). What Tocqueville observed more than a century and a half ago is still true today. See, e.g.,
Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra
note 12, at 3, 3 ("Whether the conflict concerns racial integration or abortion, school prayer or gay
rights, flag burning or the right to die, the most polarizing controversies of today's politics often
find a home in the courtroom as well as in the legislative chamber or candidate debate.").
15. Adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment-providing for the direct election of senatorsand interest group development laid the groundwork for active engagement in judicial confirmation
hearings. See infra notes 33-35, 54-60 and accompanying text. Then, technological advances
heightened public awareness of Court activities and provided media through which the public could
hold their representatives accountable for judicial appointments. See infra text accompanying note
106.
16. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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constitutional standard for courts to follow. This Note will conclude by
asserting that the Court should formulate and apply a standard
comparable to the Eighth Amendment's "evolving standards of decency"
when invoking public opinion in Fourteenth Amendment cases.
II. POLITICIZATION OF THE SUPREME COURT
What legal scholars and political scientists typically refer to as the
politicization of the Supreme Court is not remarkable in itself. To a large
extent, politics have always dominated the nomination and confirmation
process. Americans first witnessed this in 1795 when anti-Federalist
forces defeated George Washington's nominee for Chief Justice.' 8 More
than a century later, in 1916, the nation saw it in the contentious Louis
Brandeis hearings, 19 in what one scholar described as "the most bitter
and most intensely fought [confirmation battle] in the history of the
Court." 20 Americans observed it once again in 1987 with the highly
publicized Robert Bork debacle. 2 1 Clearly, the politics of judicial
selection is nothing new. What is remarkable-and alarming-is the
politicization of judicial decision making, arguably beginning with
22
Brown, which transformed the nature of the confirmation process and
opened the door to a series of other politically charged decisions.23
17. See BENJAMIN WITrES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN
ANGRY TIMES 41, 44-45 (2006). Wittes argues that "the process of both presidential selection and
Senate consideration of justices has always contained strong political dimensions." Id. at 44. But he
argues that "the process has grown uglier, meaner, and rougher than it used to be." Id. For example,
Wittes notes that from 1945 to 1980, the average time between the judicial nomination and final
Senate action was forty-seven days; now the average time is sixty-seven days. Id at 41. Another
indicator of increased partisanship is the proliferation of the number of confirmation hearing
transcript pages. Id. at 42. Hearings averaged forty-two pages between 1930 and 1949. Id. By 1970
that number had jumped to 1117. Id
18. Id. at 45. Congress voted along ideological lines against John Rutledge for Chief Justice.
Id.
19. Id. at 44 ("The nomination of Louis D. Brandeis in 1916 makes even Clarence Thomas's
look pleasant."). Opposition to Louis Brandeis stemmed largely from anti-Semitic prejudices, and
partly from his political views. Id. at 45-46. "He was widely regarded as a dangerous radical, and
though his politics did not arise much in the hearings-which focused generally on digging for dirt
on him-numerous institutions and people opposed him at least partly on that basis." Id at 46.
20. Id. at 45; see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A

HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 135
(1999).
21. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 223 (2007) (Robert Bork "killed his [own]
nomination by articulating narrow views on the right to privacy.").
22. See Murakami, supra note 12, at 18-19.
23. See WITTES, supra note 17, at 60. After Brown, the Warren Court "began to see itself as a
vital protector of rights and liberties, including those not specifically addressed in the Constitution.
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During this period the Court more overtly embraced public opinion in its
jurisprudence.
A. Nature ofPoliticalBattles Over Supreme Court Nominees
Historically, the confirmation process has reflected the political
battles of the day. For example, regional conflict consumed late
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century politics. 24 Presidents of
that era felt obligated to replace a Justice from one region with a Justice
from the same region. 25 Then, as a wave of European immigrants
brought religious tensions to the forefront of American political life, the
tradition of a "'Catholic seat"' and a "'Jewish seat"' emerged.2 6
Thereafter, a preoccupation with racial, gender, and ethnic diversity on
the Court developed.27 Today the increasing polarization of political
parties has largely divided Americans ideologically, instead of along
regional, religious, or racial lines. 28 (Note that the composition of the
current Court includes six Catholic Justices, two Jewish Justices, and
two Justices from Trenton, New Jersey.) 2 9 Traditionally,
presidents had sought nominees who shared their ideological goals, but
they didn't go to great lengths to analyze how an appointee would rule
as a justice. That changed as the Supreme Court became more involved
in social issues. Presidents began seeking nominees they thought
would reflect their own positions.30

It recognized greater rights for criminal defendants. It imposed limits on religious expression. It
identified new constitutional rights to privacy. Its role in American society grew." GREENBURG,
supranote 21, at 24.

24. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 337-38
(2007).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 338.
27.

RICHARD

DAVIS,

ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME

COURT NOMINATION

PROCESS 48-49 (2005).
28. See TOOBIN, supra note 24, at 338.
29. The Catholic Justices are John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence
Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor. Lisa Desjardins, Sobomayor Would Be Part ofCourt's
Catholic Shift, CNN POLITICS, May 27, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/27/
sotomayor.catholic/. The Jewish Justices are Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer. See The
Oyez Project, Stephen G. Breyer, http://www.oyez.org/justices/stepheng breyer (last visited Mar.
31, 2010); The Oyez Project, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http://www.oyez.org/justices/
ruth baderginsburg (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito both hail from
Trenton, New Jersey. See NPR, Alito's Supreme Court Nomination Confirmed, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld-4982475 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010); The Oyez Project, Antonin
Scalia, http://www.oyez.org/justices/antoninscalia (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
30. See GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 40; see also MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 344 (2005) (arguing that the
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B. Transformationof the JudicialAppointment Process
The Court's activist stance in Brown, and later in Roe v. Wade,
prompted the most recent-and most transparent-transformation of
judicial appointments.32 No less significant to this transformation was
the 1913 ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for
the direct election of senators. It is no coincidence that after 1913,
senators began playing a more substantial role in judicial confirmation
hearings, especially as Supreme Court decisions became entrenched in
public debate. 34 Because the people could now hold their senators
electorally accountable, senators were forced to pay attention to policies
that concerned their constituents.3 5 One principal concern that arose after
Brown was the Court's perceived usurpation of policy areas traditionally

nomination and confirmation process is "[tihe mechanism by which the Supreme Court gets in line
with the rest of the political system"). Tushnet asserts that "presidents and justices know where the
nation is and what it will tolerate" and that "over the medium run what happens to the Court will
depend on what the people choose when they elect a president and a Senate." Id
31. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that abortion is a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause).
32. See WITTES, supra note 17, at 60 ("The courts now intervene in a breathtaking array of
democratic decisions and reserve the power to regulate questions of social policy at the core of
Americans' sense of autonomy and identity. That change began before Brown, but Brown
crystallized it, and Roe later dramatically reinforced it.").
33. U.S. Const. amend. XVII, cl. 1. "[S]ince the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment ... the states cannot control their own creation, the central government." George
Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Congressional Term Limits: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thomton, 47 ALA. L. REv. 775, 822-23 (1996) (citations omitted). Specifically, ratification
"insulated Senators from state legislative reprisals." Id. at 786; see also Michael J. Gerhardt,
Toward a Comprehensive Understandingof the FederalAppointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 467, 489 (1998) ("One obvious effect of the Seventeenth Amendment was to make the
Senate's constitutionally imposed duties, such as the confirmation of presidential nominees, subject
to popular review, comment, and reprisal."). But see Mark R. Brown, Ballot Fees As Impermissible
Qualificationsfor Federal Office, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1283, 1323 n.278 (2005) (noting "that the
states define the qualifications of the Senate's electors-be they members of the various state
legislatures or the population at-large"). Arguably then, under the Seventeenth Amendment, states
have retained a certain degree of influence over the Senate. See id.
34. The Brandeis hearings became a significant byproduct of the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment. WITrES, supra note 17, at 47-48. As "the first public, investigative
hearings conducted on a nominee by the Judiciary Committee," his hearings "began the opening up
of what had previously been a closed and secretive Senate process." Id at 48. The next "critical shift
in the confirmation process began with Brown and established a new status quo as the Court's
aggressiveness increased over the subsequent two decades." Id. at 60.
35. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicialReview: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 504 n.60 (1997); see also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REv. 577, 621 (1993) (arguing that the Seventeenth Amendment was "the most significant
structural move toward ... majoritarianism").
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reserved to congressional purview. 36 While public debate surrounding
controversial decisions handed down by the Court "is not just a
contemporary phenomenon," 37 the polemic nature of judicial
nominations is a more recent development.
The first Supreme Court nominee after Brown was John Marshall
Harlan, nominated by President Eisenhower in 1955.38 His nomination
"marked the first time the Senate sought live testimony from a
nominee ... about his view of specific cases and about his judicial
philosophy." 39 The "segregationists" took center stage during Harlan's
confirmation hearings, hoping to limit the reach of Brown by weeding
out nominees sympathetic to desegregation. 4 0 However, "[t]he norm
against asking 'a man what he will do' was still so strong, and the
endeavor of probing a nominee's substantive views on a pending case
therefore so disreputable, that they made some effort to mask what they
were doing."41 Ironically, "[tlheir questions appalled the liberals of their
36. See WrrrES, supra note 17, at 81-82. Today the courts "have their hands in a mindboggling array of political decisions in which they would not have involved themselves in the past,"
including affirmative action, medical marijuana, and the so-called right to die. Id. at 82. Critics of
judicial activism argue that the Supreme Court is a countermajoritarian institution and, as such, is
ill-suited for this policy-making role. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 343-56 (1998)
(discussing the origins of and problems associated with the Court's perceived countermajoritarian
role).
37.

MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME

COURT 3 (1999).
The claim at the heart of today's controversy is substantially the same claim that was at
the heart of most earlier controversies about constitutional rulings by the Courtnamely, that in the guise of interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme Court is actually
usurping prerogatives that under the Constitution belong to one or more other branches
or agencies of government.
Id. at 4.
38. See WITTES, supra note 17, at 60; The Oyez Project, John M. Harlan,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/john m harlan2 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
39. WITTES, supra note 17, at 60. "For most of American history, the Senate considered
Supreme Court nominees without soliciting their input. Politicians considered it an intolerable
affront to judicial independence to ask a nominee how he would vote on a matter; to answer any
such question was unthinkable." Id. at 60-61.
40. Id. at 65-68; see also Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of
Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 400 (2000) ("Harlan's nomination ignited a swift southern
backlash. No name . .. was more anathema to the ears of the southern segregationists than that of
John Marshall Harlan. Harlan's grandfather and namesake had authored the famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson in which he wrote: 'Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens.' Although the elder Harlan's dissent was not even cited in Brown,
the reaction to his grandson's Supreme Court nomination was predictable." (citations omitted)).
41. WITTES, supra note 17, at 65. Southern senators did not question Harlan specifically
about desegregation but instead focused on political opinions that would reveal his social
philosophy. "Instead of focusing on desegregation itself, [Southern senators] attacked Harlan's
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day, including some who .. . would go on to adopt their questioning
tactics. ,,42 President Richard Nixon's threat to upend the Warren Court
legacy by nominating conservative Justices to the bench prompted the
liberal senators to change their tune. 4 3 The "effort to mask"" the nature
of the questioning was abandoned as liberals, too, began actively
probing judicial candidates.45
But the true watershed moment was Roe, which forever changed
the tenor of confirmation hearings.4 6 More than a decade passed,
however, before the ripple effects of that decision became readily
apparent. The anti-abortion movement had not yet galvanized itself by
the nomination of John Paul Stevens in 1975.47 Because religious
conservatives were still not a potent political force in 1981, President
Ronald Reagan ignored their opposition to Sandra Day O'Connor.48
Everything changed in 1987 when President Reagan nominated Robert
Bork, the patron saint of the right-to-life movement. 4 9 A Democratic
majority in the Senate defeated Bork largely because of his narrow

relationship with a group advocating closer ties with England and his having studied at Oxford,
painting him as favoring world government." Id.; see also Snyder, supra note 40, at 401 ("They
even accused Harlan, an extremely prominent Wall Street lawyer, a Second Circuit judge who had
upheld several Smith Act convictions, and eventually the most conservative member of the Warren
Court, of harboring 'Communist sympathies."').

42. WITrES, supra note 17, at 75.
43. Id at 76-78. During his first term, President Nixon nominated six individuals to the
Supreme Court, four of whom the Senate confirmed. Id. at 76. The philosophy of Nixon's nominees
triggered a complete switch in senatorial tactics-liberals, like the Southern senators, began actively
questioning judicial nominees. Id.
44. Id. at 65.
45. Id. at 76 ("They did this, the record makes abundantly clear, quite consciously, and for a
simple reason: They now had a lot to protect in the aggressive liberalism of the Warren Court.").
Some question the propriety of senators' modem questioning tactics in judicial confirmation
hearings. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1335, 1342 (2001) (noting that confirmation hearings could be a forum for senators to instruct
nominees and sitting Justices on constitutional interpretation through the advice and consent power).
"Solemn discussions about constitutional law during Supreme Court confirmation hearings may
cause even the more political senators to rise above their baser motives." Id.
46. See GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 221 ("The landmark decision that is both a rallying cry
and a dividing line, that is passionately viewed as either a key protector of women's rights or a
lawless exercise in judicial overreaching, that has reshaped the nation's political parties and has
been a core issue in everything from school board elections to presidential contests, that has become
the ultimate touchstone in the ongoing conflict over culture and values throughout America, has for
more than two decades consumed Supreme Court nominations and confirmation proceedings.").
47. Id. at 222.
48. Id
49. Id. at 223 ("Roe and the issue of abortion became more prominent in the later Reagan
years, when the administration began urging the Supreme Court to overturn the decision. Groups on
both sides of the issue organized to fight.").
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views on a constitutional right to privacy.50 Bork's failed nomination
definitively pushed abortion to the forefront of American politics-all
nominees since Bork have been questioned about Roe and privacy
rights, including Sonia Sotomayor. The following is an excerpt from a
back-and-forth about privacy rights between Senator Tom Coburn (ROK) and Sotomayor during her confirmation hearings. Senator Coburn
noted:
You've been asked a lot of questions about abortion. And you've said
that Roe v. Wade is settled law. Where are we today? What is the
settled law in America about abortion?
JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I can speak to what the court has said in its
precedent. In Planned Parenthood versus Casey, the court reaffirmed
the core holding of Roe versus Wade, that a woman has a
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy in certain
circumstances. In Casey, the court announced that in reviewing state
regulations that may apply to that right, that the court considers
whether that regulation has an undue burden on the woman's
constitutional right. That's my understanding of what the state of the
law is.
SEN. COBURN: So let me give you a couple of cases. Let's say I'm
38 weeks pregnant and we discover a small spina bifida sac on the
lower sacrum, the lower part of the back, on my baby, and I feel like I
just can't handle a child with that. Would it be legal in this country to
terminate that child's life?
JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I can't answer that question in the abstract,
because I would have to look at what the state of the state's law was on
52
that question and what the state said with respect to that issue.
While Sotomayor refused to answer Coburn's hypothetical conclusively,
Republicans, as the minority party in Congress, clearly could not derail
Sotomayor's nomination on this issue.

50. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1409 (2006) ("Robert Bork had
with regularity publicly questioned Griswold, [and] Roe .... Bork's expressed skepticism about the
constitutional foundations of sex discrimination and privacy case law drew fire during his
confirmation hearings and played a crucial role in the Senate's refusal to confirm him to the
Supreme Court.").
51. See GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 223.
52. Transcript: Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, Day 3, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/us/politics/15confirm-text.html.
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Interest groups have also jumped into the fray. 54 "Interest
groups ... use the same tools to influence judicial appointments as they
do in opposing or supporting any piece of legislation." 55 Groups often
encourage their members to "write, call, and lobby" congressmen in
support of their agendas.56 After President George W. Bush nominated
John Roberts to the Court, NARAL Pro-Choice America organized an
opposition campaign and mobilized its members to contact their senators
"to urge them to oppose his confirmation."57 A number of interest
groups also launched opposition strategies after Sotomayor's
nomination, including the Family Research Council, the Judicial
Confirmation Network, and the Southern Baptist Convention, which
focused on the controversial New Haven firefighters case58 and
Sotomayor's "wise Latina" statement. 5 9 "These [interest group] efforts
have apparently been effective in influencing senators."60
III. ROLE OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN SUPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING

As the public (and interest groups) became more engaged in the
issues before the Supreme Court, so did the political branches. 6 1 Then,
once Congress and the President focused their policy agendas on
assessments of public opinion-particularly regarding constitutional
issues and the Justices appointed to the bench-so too did the Court.6 2
"Few dispute that public opinion is reflected in the choices of the
Court."6 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court could be called a reactionary force
53. Sotomayor received confirmation from the Senate. See Lisa Desjardins et al., Senate
Confirms Sonia Sotomayor for Supreme Court, CNN POLITICS, Aug. 6, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/06/sonia.sotomayor/index.html.
54. David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L.
REv. 1033, 1062 (2008) (reviewing WITTES, supra note 17, and GREENBURG, supra note 21 ("The
prominence and influence of external forces, most notably organized interest groups,
have ... grown over the past twenty years, further politicizing the judicial appointments process.")).
55. Id. at 1074.
5 6. Id.
57. Id.
58. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming in a three-paragraph opinion
the lower court's rejection ofwhite firefighters' Title VII claim), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
59. Mears, supra note 3; Posting of David D. Kirkpatrick to The Caucus: The Politics and
Government Blog of the Times, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/interest-groupsprepare-to-battle-on-sotomayor/ (May 27, 2009, 10:56 EST).
60. Stras, supra note 54, at 1063.
61. See supra Part II.B.
62. See infra Part ll.A-C.
63. Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to PublicPreferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1020 (2004).
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that responds to the ebb and flow of the political tide. More
questionable is "[t]he mechanism by which [this reflection] takes
place"-either indirectly or directly. One theory is that public opinion
indirectly affects judicial decision making through popular elections.6 6 A
second theory holds that there is "a direct causal connection between
public preferences and Supreme Court policy." 6 7 Specifically, under this
theory it is argued that, even within a countermajoritarian framework,
"the justices' protection of minority interests tends to occur only when
public opinion supports such outcomes."69
This second theory has been tempered by the proposition that while
public opinion might influence individual Justices over time, it does not

64. See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 24, at 340 ("[T]he Court is a product of a democracy and
represents, with sometimes chilling precision, the best and worst of the people."); see also Thomas
W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 47 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 569, 620-22 (2003) (explaining the external strategic model, which posits that the Court aligns
itself with political institutions and the general public); TUSHNET, supra note 3 1, at 344 (arguing
that the politicized nomination and confirmation process aligns the Court with the political system).
65. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 63, at 1020.
66. See id. McGuire posits that "elections determine the composition of Congress and the
White House, whose members in turn select the justices. Presidents and Senators, who necessarily

reflect majority preferences, are motivated to select justices with whom they share an ideological
affinity." Id. Some scholars theorize that the Supreme Court serves a majoritarian role, representing
"numerically large, economically and politically dominant majorities." See Thomas R. Marshall,
The Supreme Court and the Grass Roots: Whom Does the Court Represent Best?, 76 JUDICATURE
22, 24 (1992); see also Neal Devins, Tom Delay: Popular Constitutionalist?,81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1055, 1067 (2006) (arguing that the Court is more likely than Congress to heed majoritarian
preferences, as "there is strong evidence suggesting that the Supreme Court may be a more accurate
bellwether of the median voter than Congress"); WITrES, supra note 17, at 4 ("[T]he Court
functions neither as a consistently conservative nor as a consistently liberal bastion but as a
decidedly middle-of-the-road actor-arguably representing the center of gravity of American
political life better than both President Bush and either party's caucus in either house of
Congress.").
67. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 63, at 1020.
68. Another theory is that the Court takes a countermajoritarian approach, responding "to
small, unpopular, or politically impotent minorities who have little other effective access to the
political arena." Marshall, supra note 66, at 24; see also Lawrence Friedman, Public Opinion and
Strict Scrutiny Equal ProtectionReview: HigherEducation Affirmative Action and the Future of the
Equal Protection Framework, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 267, 271 (2004) (arguing that "the
judiciary serves a democracy-reinforcing function by, among other things, preventing political
majorities from using lawmaking processes to discriminate against certain individuals").
69. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 63, at 1020. Scholars debate "the degree to which mass
opinion actually moves the Court in one direction or another." Id. at 1020-21. Some note "the
general correspondence between public opinion and judicial outcomes," while others ask "whether
the Court's liberalism follows the ebb and flow of public mood, after controlling for its indirect
effects." Id.
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necessarily determine the outcome of particular cases.70 In other words,
if Supreme Court decisions are in line with popular preferences, it is not
because the Court reflects public opinion, but rather because the Court
shapes it. In this view, most would agree that the Court wields enormous
power over our everyday lives.71 Beginning in the mid-1950s, Chief
Justice Earl Warren steered the Court-and the country-toward a new
social reality, redefining seemingly inherent values and shaping a new
public consensus.72 But whether Supreme Court decisions shape or
reflect popular preferences, it is evident that public opinion historically
has been a factor in judicial decision making, which is a trend that
continues today. As will be discussed in Part V, this trend has had a
telling effect on politically volatile areas of constitutional law, namely
equal protection and substantive due process.
A. Public Opinion Has HistoricallyBeen a Factorin Judicial
Decision Making
That public opinion has an effect on judicial decision making is not
a recent phenomenon.74 For example, in United States v. Hudson,
Justice William Johnson invoked public opinion in holding that federal

70. Id at 1021 ("That the votes of a given member of the Court are influenced by mass
opinion does not demonstrate-at least not directly-that the Court's cases are decided any
differently as a consequence.").
71. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Role of the
Academic Commentator, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 943, 955 (1999) ("The Supreme Court's rulings have
enormous impact on people in the most important, and sometimes the most intimate, aspect of their
lives.").
72. TUSHNET, supra note 3 1, at 343 ("[T]he real story of the Warren Court was that it got
ahead of the political consensus for a while and then the consensus caught up."). Tushnet also
asserts that while an emerging fiscal conservatism characterized the Rehnquist Court, a comparable
cultural conservatism never materialized. Id. at 10. He credits "the patterns occurring in American
politics generally" with conservatives' failures to significantly scale back and upheave the Warren
Court legacy. Id. In other words, the Rehnquist Court stayed in line with public opinion fiscally and
socially.
73. See David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: JudicialDecision Making
in the Post-New Deal Period,47 J. POL. 652, 662-64 (1985) (examining the Court's inclination to
follow the trend of nationwide public opinion); Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control: The
MajoritarianCourt and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379,
389-92 (2006) (discussing how public opinion affects the judicial decision-making process).
74. For a historical look at the role of public opinion in Supreme Court jurisprudence, see
James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV.
1037, 1048-1104. See also Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court:
Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. ScI. 468, 492-93
(1997) (arguing that judicial responses to public opinion occur generally and that "no justice is
entirely or completely unresponsive to the public's mood").
75. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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courts lacked the authority to create criminal common law, reasoning
that the public would not accept the Court's intervention in that area.76
The Steel Seizure case7 7 is another example of the Court's reliance on
public opinion, at least according to William Rehnquist who, as a law
clerk to Justice Robert H. Jackson, concluded that popular sentiment
influenced the Court's handling of that case. 78 Newspapers and the
public followed the case closely from the very beginning. 7 9 "The
government's [initial] position-that the President had a wide-ranging
inherent power to deal with emergencies, and that the Bill of Rights
limited Congress but not the President, shocked almost every observer of
the Washington scene."80 The case's speedy progression from the district
court to the Supreme Court, the public's ambivalence about the Korean
War, and President Harry Truman's low approval rating also indicate
that public opinion influenced the outcome, especially considering that
eight of the Justices had been appointed by Democratic presidents.8 1
Ultimately, the outcome, was one that "would not have [been] predicted
simply by reading the relevant cases and assessing what was thought to
be the dominant jurisprudential outlook of the court which decided the
case." 82
An early draft of Justice Jackson's much-acclaimed concurrence in
Steel Seizure cautioned that congressional authority should serve as a
check on presidential power during certain crises. 3 Justice Jackson's
basic point was that if Congress cannot rally to serve as that check, then
76. Id. at 32; see also Editorial, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 17, 1925, at 85, 87 ("To a large extent the Supreme Court, under the guise of
constitutional interpretation of words whose contents are derived from the disposition of the
Justices, is the reflector of that impalpable but controlling thing, the general drift of public
opinion.").
77. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)
(holding that the president does not have the power to seize private property absent an enumerated
or statutory authority).
78. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 94-95
(1987).
79. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 751, 765 (1986) ("From beginning to end, the case and its progress through the courts was not
only a national event, but very much a local event in Washington, and the case was covered to a
fare-thee-well by the Washington daily newspapers.").
80. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted that the government quickly realized its mistake in making
this argument and changed its position. Id.
81. See id. at 766-67. This point is significant because President Truman was a Democrat.
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Truman, Harry S., http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000387 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
82. Rehnquist, supra note 80, at 768.
83. See Adam J. White, Justice Jackson'sDraft Opinions in the Steel Seizure Cases, 69 ALB.
L. REv. 1107, 1123 (2006).
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the public will have no choice but to turn to the executive, who could
seize the opportunities afforded by this shift in a way detrimental to the
American system of government.84 Interestingly, a comparable situation
emerged from the failure of the political branches in the 1950s to resolve
escalating racial issues, compelling the Warren Court to step in and end
school segregation.85 Ever since, when it comes to protecting-and
creating-individual rights, the public has largely relied on the Supreme
Court rather than lawmakers. This reliance is one motivator behind the
Court's increased use of public opinion in its judicial decision making.
Ironically, even though the Court might have admirable intentions in
factoring public opinion into its analysis, shifts in popular preferences
might produce transitory outcomes over the long run. Such transience
would ultimately be more detrimental to the public than would the
Justices ignoring their opinion when deciding individual cases. The
people need and expect consistent legal analysis from the Court.
B. "Reliable" Methodfor MeasuringPublic Opinion Established
Historians typically cite three eras where the federal government
broadened its protection of the American people: Reconstruction, the
New Deal, and the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s.88 During
Reconstruction and the New Deal, the political branches took the reins,
while the Supreme Court limited their initiatives. 89 But during the Civil
Rights Era, "the Court arguably took the leading role."90 Although
Brown is often credited with triggering the modem politicization of
judicial decision making,9 1 the Court's intervention in social policy

84. Id.
85. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
86. Patrick M. Garry, Liberty from on High: The Growing Reliance on a Centralized
Judiciary to ProtectIndividual Liberty, 95 KY. L.J. 385, 423 (2006) ("The increasing role of the
judiciary in American politics is not the sole work of the courts, but rather has been accomplished
with at least the passive acquiescence of the public."). Garry asserts that the public's loss of faith in
the democratic process contributed to the Court's assumption of a legislative role. Id. at 424.
87. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
88. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section Five, 13
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 485, 510 (2004).
89. Id. ("Indeed, the Court served as a major obstacle to Congress' protecting its people,
restrictively reading congressional power to protect individual rights during the first two eras.").
90. Id Zietlow noted that even though the Court created desegregation policy, "federal
legislation was necessary to insure the promise of equality that the Court had articulated in Brown."
Id Moreover, "[tihe only time in history that the Court has adopted a deferential approach to
Congress' power to enact civil rights legislation was during the 1960s, a time when the Court had
also embraced its own role as protector of 'discrete and insular minorities."' Id. at 510-11.
91. See WITTES, supra note 17, at 60.
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arguably predates that landmark decision. The Court's decision in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 92 has been pointed to as a
credible benchmark. 9 3 The Court applied a low standard of judicial
review (rational basis) to the economic regulation at issue in that case,
but Justice Harlan Fiske Stone suggested in a footnote that other types of
laws-such as legislation aimed at "discrete and insular minorities"might require a heightened standard of judicial review. 9 4 But regardless
of where credit is due, it has become the assumed responsibility of the
Court "to safeguard the procedural norms of democratic decision making
and to protect the substantive rights of at least certain political and social
minorities."95 Accordingly, the Court has immersed itself in "conflicts
over racial segregation, race-based affirmative action, sex-based
discrimination, homosexuality, abortion, and physician-assisted
suicide."96
In 1935, a few years prior to Carolene Products, George Gallup
and Elmo Roper established a new method for surveying public
opinion. 9 7 Their quota-sampling model incorporated government data

92. 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938) (holding a federal law prohibiting the interstate shipment of
certain milk products under the Commerce Clause constitutional).
93. See Barnum, supra note 73, at 663-64. Barnum also points out that "the Court's decisions
on school segregation, interracial marriage, and abortion, although apparently compatible with the
trend of public opinion, were nevertheless opposed by a majority of Americans at the time they
were handed down." Id. at 663.
94. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4. For an explanation of the meaning of Justice
Stone's famous "Footnote Four," see TOOBIN, supra note 24, at 209 ("In cases about economic or
property rights, the justices would defer to the political process. But when it came to laws that
appeared to be targeted at racial minorities or other 'discrete and insular minorities,' the Court
would apply 'more searching judicial scrutiny."').
95. Barnum, supra note 73, at 663-64. But see John Hart Ely, Toward a RepresentationReinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 456 (1978) (suggesting that Footnote
Four places the "focus not on whether this or that substantive value is unusually important or
fundamental, but rather on whether the opportunity to participate either in the political processes by
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those
processes have reached, has been unduly constricted.").
96. PERRY, supra note 37, at 15 ("Several of the most divisive moral conflicts that have beset
us Americans in the period since the end of World War II have been transmuted into constitutional
conflicts-conflicts about what the Constitution of the United States forbids-and resolved as
such."). The Court's intervention in these areas has colored the political discourse. See, e.g.,
Transcript:Final PresidentialDebate, CBSNEWS, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2008/10/16/politics/2008debates/main4525254.shtml; see also The Situation Room (CNN television
broadcast June 26, 2008), transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0806/26/sitroom.02.html (providing the reactions of 2008 presidential candidates Barack Obama
and John McCain to the Supreme Court's decision in Districtof Columbia v. Heller).
97. See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional
Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 14-16, 18-19 (2002), for an account of the creation of
Gallup and Roper's polling technique.
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and election figures to poll a representative sample of Americans that
would ideally "reflect the views" of the population at large.98 Several
studies indicate that individual Justices increasingly factored public
opinion into their decision making99 after Gallup and Roper developed
their polling technique,10 0 which is arguably a reliable indicator of
popular preferences. In the context of judicial decision making, polls are
more reliable than other assessment mechanisms, such as "the judge's
impression of what public sentiment may be, the judge's own opinion as
a proxy, or the judge's own unscientific poll."101 But critics argue that
polls are quintessentially unreliable, explaining that poll questions do not
precisely reflect the legal issues before the Court.10 2 Nevertheless, it is
undisputable that polls play an important role in American politics.o
Technological innovations have also contributed to the effect that
public opinion and politics have on the Supreme Court. Significantly,
television first became available during the period when Gallup and
Roper developed their polling model. 10 4 This development-particularly
after the introduction of C-SPAN-heightened public awareness of the
Supreme Court.105 Today, political candidates know that their

98. Id. at 14; see also THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
2 (2008) ("[U]ntil the 1930s, most polls only measured the attitudes of targeted or local groups,
such as farmers or consumers or likely voters, rather than the general public."). Gallup and Roper's
new model "allowed cheaper, faster, and more accurate nationwide polls than those in earlier
years.... For the first time nationwide polls included questions on Supreme Court decisions." Id.
99. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 36 tbls.2.1 & 2.2, 37 tbl.2.3 (comparing
nationwide public opinion polls with Supreme Court decisions).
100. See Cushman, supra note 97, at 14-16, 18-19 (detailing creation of Gallup and Roper's
new polling technique).
101. Roesch, supranote 73, at 418-19.
102. See Barnum, supra note 73, at 654 n.6 ("[T]he items used in opinion surveys do not
always precisely paraphrase the legal issues addressed by the Court. Thus, the extent of agreement
or disagreement between the Court and the public is not always entirely clear.").
103. Polls' rise in influence coincided with the countermajoritarian approach taken by the
Court after Carolene Products Co. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing studies that
judges increasingly factored public opinion into their decision making after Gallup and Roper
established their polling technique in 1935). The Court decided Carolene Products in 1938. United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
104. See Television History-The First 75 Years, Brief History of TV, http://www.tvhistory.tv/
History/o20of%20TV.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (noting that the first mechanical television
sets were sold to the public between 1928 and 1934); see also supra text accompanying note 97.
105. See, e.g., Marilyn Duff, C-SPAN Helps Viewers Bypass Liberal Spin of Major Media,
HUM. EVENTs, Feb. 17, 1995, at 12 ("Those who testified in [Clarence Thomas'] defense, as well as
those who cast doubt on the credibility of Anita Hill, were . . . allowed to have their say .. . on CSPAN. The American public saw the truth, responded to their senators and Thomas was
confirmed."); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 950 ("The educational role of the media and
commentators is important because the public generally has relatively little knowledge about the
Court, its processes, or even the Constitution.").
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constituents are attuned to the decisions handed down by the Court and
actively campaign on the type of Justices they would appoint to the
bench.106 Their emphasis on the makeup of the Court and the resultant
politicization of the appointment process has trickled down into the inner
workings of the Court itself.
C. Modern Trend ofLooking to Public Opinion in
JudicialDecision Making
Unlike the executive and legislative branches, the judicial branch is
not electorally accountable to the public. The Justices effectively have
life tenure, subject of course to impeachment. 0 7 Consequently, some
scholars argue that any effect public opinion has on individual judicial
decisions is marginal. 08 They liken its impact to the influence that
Justices' own political tendencies have on their judicial philosophies.'0 9
Even several of the Justices themselves have, over the years, disavowed
the notion that public opinion has-or should have-any influence on
their decision making. For example:
Justice Douglas described judges as strong amid the winds of political
change. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "legislatures, not courts, are
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of
the people." Justice Powell agreed, noting that "the assessment of
popular opinion is essentially a legislative, not a judicial, function."
Justice Frankfurter also wrote that courts are unlike representative
bodies because they10"are not designed to be a good reflex of a
democratic society."

106. See supranote 96.
107. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
108. See Roesch, supra note 73, at 392 ("Judges are not weathervanes, and public opinion
appears to have only a minor influence in the decision-making process."); see also William Mishler
& Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a CountermajoritarianInstitution? The Impact of
Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 87, 88 (1993) (noting that
opinion studies tend to focus on specific policy issues and individual Court decisions). This focus
assumes, in effect, that the impact of public opinion is direct and immediate-that the
decisions of justices on pending cases are influenced by relevant public opinion polls
seen in the morning paper. A more realistic assumption is that public opinion, if it is
important, influences the Court as a result of gradual, almost imperceptible changes in
the attitudes and beliefs of individual justices as they adapt, consciously or not, to longterm, fundamental trends in the ideological temper of the public.
Mishler & Sheehan, supra, at 88.
109. See Roesch, supra note 73, at 392.
110. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
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Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in a speech in the mid1980s that because the Justices are not isolated from current events, they
cannot completely ignore public opinion on political, social, and
constitutional issues. 11
Even if public opinion has only a marginal influence in individual
cases, that influence can be consequential in the aggregate.1 2 In fact, in
an empirical study of the effect of public opinion on judicial decision
making, Thomas Marshall found that "[a]t least 123 Rehnquist Court
opinions directly mentioned public opinion in a majority, concurring,
dissenting, or per curiam opinion-an average of about six to seven
opinions per term," 1 3 doubling the number of direct mentions made by
the Warren and Burger Courts.l14 It is no coincidence that the Court
increasingly incorporated public opinion into its decisions after the
development of the Gallup and Roper polling technique. The Court's
post-Carolene Products approach evolved almost simultaneously
alongside this polling innovation and was indicative of the alarming role
that public opinion would play in the Court's substantive due process

111. See GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 26 (highlighting a speech given by Justice Rehnquist
about reasons presidents largely have failed to transform the Supreme Court); see also Rehnquist,
supra note 79, at 768 (conceding that Justices and other judges might unconsciously be influenced
by public opinion).
The judges of any court of last resort . .. work in an insulated atmosphere in their
courthouse where they sit on the bench hearing oral arguments or sit in their chambers
writing opinions. But these same judges go home at night and read the newspapers or
watch the evening news on television; they talk to their family and friends about current
events.... Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more
escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people working at
other jobs.
Id.
112. See Roesch, supranote 73, at 392.
113. MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 4.
A direct mention of public opinion either uses the term "public opinion," a close
rewording (such as "opinion of the public"), or a close synonym that clearly refers to the
mass public's attitudes and beliefs (such as "poll" data, "survey" results, the "common
perception," "public reputation," "public confidence," "public's consciousness," a
"national consensus," "public disapproval," "public confidence," [sic] "public trust," or
"public attitudes and beliefs").
Id. Each of the fourteen Justices who served during Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice had at least
one direct mention. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 5; see Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 108, at 88 (noting that concrete evidence is
lacking about the relationship between earlier Court decisions and public opinion because
"'scientific opinion polls are of relatively recent origin"' (citation omitted)); see also Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279, 284 (1957) ("For the greater part of the Court's history ... there is simply no way of
establishing with any high degree of confidence whether a given alternative was or was not
supported by a majority or a minority of adults or even of voters.").
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and equal protection analysis."' 5 As will be discussed in Part IV, this role
is particularly pronounced among the swing Justices on the Court.
1. Reasons Justices Might Heed Public Opinion
The Court is indisputably affected by changes in public opinion, but
no one Justice attaches the same weight to popular mood shifts. There
are general reasons the Court as a whole might consider popular
sentiment. One scholar suggests that Supreme Court Justices are more
likely than Congress to heed popular preferences because the Court is
not controlled by interest groups or political agendas.'16 Other scholars
argue that the Court depends on public support for its legitimacy, so the
Justices, like politicians, take a results-oriented approach."' 7 This
legitimacy theory posits that Justices modify their own views to match
those of the general public so that their policy decisions will be
enforced." 8 One critic of this theory argues that the Court's legitimacy is
actually "based on the perception and reality that it does not decide cases
based on the personal interests of the Justices or based on external
lobbying and pressures.""19
Heeding public opinion is also part and parcel of certain canons of
constitutional construction. For example, when interpreting the text of a
constitutional provision, judges can inquire "what norm [the Framers]
(probably) understood, or would have understood, the provision to
communicate."1 2 0 However, "[o]ne can [also] inquire what norm the
115. See MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 43 (arguing that in light of Justice Stone's famous
footnote in Carolene Products, "courts should take a critical look at laws or policies that infringe
upon Bill of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment protections for unpopular or controversial groups");
see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937). Marshall cautions
courts to ignore majority public opinion in these cases. MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 43. But see
Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 108, at 88 (arguing that "public opinion studies [tend] to focus on
the decisions of the Court only in a few landmark cases," meaning that the "studies are limited in
what they can tell us about the relationship of broader trends in public opinion and the myriad, more
typical cases decided by the Court with little fanfare or publicity").
116. See Devins, supra note 66, at 1062 ("Against the backdrop of increasing partisanship in
Congress . . .there is reason to think that the Supreme Court will steer a more centrist course than
Congress or the White House. The Supreme Court, in other words, better represents median voters
than does the Congress, whose energy is focused on the interest groups and partisans who dominate
party politics and party primaries.").
117. See Roesch, supranote 73, at 379, 390-91.
118. See Merrill, supra note 64, at 620 ("Justices behave strategically by modifying their
preferences in light of the views of other political institutions and the general public. They do so, it
is assumed, because they want their policy preferences to stick-to be respected and enforced by
other power centers in society.").
119. Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 947 (emphasis added). Arguably then, the Court's
decisions are more likely to be enforced if the Justices do not take public opinion into account.
120. PERRY, supra note 37, at 26.
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provision in question is now taken to represent-or what norm it shall
hereafter be taken to represent."1 21 One way judges discern these norms
is by looking to measurements of public opinion, such as polling data,
state legislative action, or decisions made by sentencing juries.122
Vanity is a reason individual Justices might pay close attention to
public opinion.12 3 Justice Anthony Kennedy has a particular "sensitivity
to evolving social trends."l 24 Kennedy's "concern for his public
persona" was recounted by one of his former law clerks, who said that
his boss worried about how decisions would be perceived and how they
would be treated by the media. 125 It likewise has been suggested that the
fallout from Bush v. Gorel26 acutely affected Kennedy because the
public viewed the result as politically motivated:
Of the five justices in the majority, Kennedy had the hardest time with
the aftermath of Bush v. Gore. ... There would be, it turned out, two

Anthony Kennedys on the Supreme Court-the one before December
12, 2000, and the one after-and his transformation was surely one of
the most unexpected legacies of this epochal case.127
Whatever the reason, it is clear that the Court in general and the
Justices individually do, to a certain extent, heed public opinion in their
decision making. This trend evolved as lawmakers and the public
became more engaged in the issues before, and knowledgeable of the
actors on, the Court. The cause and effect are circuitous: The Court
carved out a niche for itself in creating and protecting individual rights;
the people felt they should have a say in what those rights should be and
looked to their lawmakers for support; electorally accountable senators
became more engaged in the judicial confirmation process; judicial
121. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
122. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing state legislative
action and polling data); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (noting that the actions of
sentencing juries are a "significant and reliable . . . index" of the values of the public).
123. See Merrill, supra note 64, at 628-29. Merrill argues that "[h]aving a good reputation
translates into tangible benefits, such as expense-paid appearances at seminars held in posh resorts,
and intangible benefits, such as awards, honors, and praise from editorial writers and other opinion
leaders." Id. at 629.
124. Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M Kennedy and the
Concept of Emergent Rights, 69 ALB. L. REv. 237, 242 (2005) (arguing that this sensitivity is why
Justice Kennedy has not voted to overrule Roe v. Wade).
125. TUSHNET, supra note 30, at 176 ("Kennedy 'would constantly refer to how it's going to
be perceived, how the papers are going to do it, how it's going to look."' (quoting Jeffrey Rosen,
The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82, 86)).
126. 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that the Florida Supreme Court's decision ordering the
manual recount of ballots in the 2000 presidential election violated the Equal Protection Clause).
127. TOOBIN, supra note 24, at 182.
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nominees were subjected to very public screening procedures and forced
almost out of necessity to know where public opinion fell on highly
charged issues; the Justices became, perhaps even subconsciously,
accountable to the court of public opinion; and the Court felt compelled
to create and protect individual rights in accord with popular
preferences.
2. Examples Where Supreme Court Decisions Reflect Public
Opinion
Thomas Marshall conducted an expansive analysis of public
opinion polls during the Rehnquist Court era and concluded that a
majority of Supreme Court decisions accorded with popular
preferences.12 8 "During the Rehnquist Court, pollsters wrote well over
two thousand poll questions tapping attitudes on Supreme Court
decisions, the Court as an institution, or individual justices or
nominees. ,,129 Marshall found that about three of every five Rehnquist
Court decisions accurately reflected polling data. 13 0 He documented 111
poll-to-decision matches between 1986 and 2005, including decisions on
the merits, denials of certiorari, and denials of injunctive relief. 13 ' A
majority of Americans agreed with the Court's five-to-four decision in
Grutter v. Bollinger,132 which held that the Equal Protection Clause did
not prohibit the University of Michigan Law School from using race as a
factor in admissions. 3 3 The Court's decisions in Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale,134 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,135 Kansas v.
Hendricks,13 6 and Troxel v. Granvillel37 also reflected public opinion. 3 1

128. MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 3. Marshall notes that "[w]hen public opinion is one-sided,
closely focused on an issue, and well informed on an issue, the justices would not necessarily need
to see any public opinion polls. The justices could gauge public attention and interest from news
reports, public statements, or interest group activities." Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 3 ("On the average, major pollsters wrote roughly 122 questions a year-thereby
providing a rich source of data by which to examine attitudes toward the Court.").
130. Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 27, 29. A poll-to-decision match describes a case that reflects the results of a poll
that directly addressed the particular issue of that case. Id. at 26-27.
132. Id at 168 app. 1.
133. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
134. 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from
requiring Boy Scouts of America to retain a homosexual assistant scoutmaster in its organization).
135. 506 U.S. 263, 266, 277-78 (1993) (holding that the right to abortion does not preclude
anti-abortion protesters from organizing demonstrations that block access to abortion clinics).
136. 521 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1997) (holding that Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act
satisfies substantive due process requirements because it requires a finding of dangerousness either
to one's self or to others as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 11

388

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:367

Marshall describes fifteen models that could explain this link between
Supreme Court jurisprudence and public opinion, some of which focus
on public opinion itself, others on popular judicial theories (such as
judicial restraint), the Justices' backgrounds, the public's reactions to
Court decisions, and political realignment. 13 9
Most direct mentions of public opinion were seen in criminal
cases; 14 0 the second highest number of mentions came in substantive due
process cases.141 Excluding denials of certiorari, the top two categories
of Rehnquist-era cases that matched public opinion were "criminal
rights, courts, police" at twenty-eight percent and "privacy, morality,
abortion" at twenty percent142-issues submerged in public debate.
"Overall, nearly four-fifths of the Rehnquist Court's direct mentions of
public opinion reflected a generally positive view of public opinion.
Only a fifth of its direct mentions reflected the negative view that public
opinion was a threat to rights."1 4 3 Because individual Justices are likely
to take public opinion into account when deciding cases, popular
preferences have played, and will continue to play, a significant role in
politicized areas of constitutional law.144
3. Examples Where Supreme Court Has Explicitly Relied on
Public Opinion
Atkins v. Virginia1 4 5 is a perfect example of the Court's overt
reliance on public opinion.14 6 A national consensus "reflected in [the]
deliberations" of "the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges"
influenced the Atkins Court's reasoning and ultimately controlled the
137. 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not permit states to
issue child-visitation orders contrary to parents' wishes).
138. MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 165-67 app. 1.
139. Id at 14-15. For example, one model posits that "the distribution and intensity of public
opinion affect the Supreme Court's level of agreement with public opinion." Id at 15. A second
model contends that the Supreme Court has historically been "extremely deferential toward federal
laws and policies." Id. at 16. A third model maintains that because the Court has traditionally
deferred to federal policy, it has not been "as deferential toward challenged state and local laws and
policies." Id. at 16-17. Other examples focus on the Court's "routine customs and norms" and the
role of interest groups and political parties. Id. at 17-18.
140. Id. at 8.
141. Id at 36 tbl.2.1.
142. Id
143. Id at 9.
144. Id. ("That the justices themselves apparently hold a generally positive view of American
public opinion may, in part, explain why most Supreme Court decisions agree with public
opinion.").
145. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
146. MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 6-7.
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outcome.14 7 Thirteen years earlier, the Court, relying on state statutes
and public opinion surveys, had found that there was no national
consensus against imposition of the death penalty on the mentally
retarded.148 The Atkins Court observed that much had changed since
Penry v. Lynaugh, noting a "dramatic shift in the state legislative
landscape."l 49 In 1989, only two states prohibited execution of the
mentally retarded.150 Responding to public outcry over Penry and high
profile executions, state legislatures across the country enacted statutes
prohibiting the death penalty in these circumstances.' 5 ' "It [was] not so
much the number of these States that [was] significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change." 52 The majority also cited
polling data submitted in an amicus brief as evidence supporting its
contention that most Americans believe the mentally retarded should not
be subject to the death penalty.' 5 3 As will be explained in Part V, it
makes sense to invoke public opinion as a factor in Eighth Amendment
cases, which are decided based on evolving standards of decency.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 54
reaffirmed a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy.15 5 It also rejected
Roe v. Wade's trimester framework and established an undue burden test
to determine whether state regulations effectively prevent women from
seeking pre-viability abortions.15 In the Court's plurality opinion,
Justice O'Connor suggested that under certain circumstances, social and
political pressures should be a factor in the Court's decision making. 1
According to Marshall, Justice O'Connor argued that

147. 536 U.S. at 307.
148. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). Note that in Penry, Justice O'Connor was a
member of the majority, id at 307 (showing that Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the
Court, except for Part IV-C), and later was a member of the six-to-three majority in Atkins, which
relied on the shift in public opinion to prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded. Atkins, 536
U.S. at 305, 321 (showing that Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
149. 536 U.S. at 310.
150. 492 U.S. at 334.
151. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
152. Id. at 315.
153. Id. at 316 n.21.
154. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
155. Id at 845-46.
156. Id. at 872-74.
157. Id. at 854-69; see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals,82 WASH. L. REV. 1,
72 (2007) ("The Court can be an agent of change, but when it does more than validate an existing
consensus, it risks halting-even reversing-change that is already in progress."); Roesch, supra
note 73, at 397 ("Stare decisis also serves as a very real constraint on judicial decision-making.").
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in extremely important cases the Court should consider public opinion
in deciding whether to overturn precedents.. . . In Justice O'Connor's
view, the Court could protect its legitimacy by upholding a wellknown, recent precedent that still enjoyed widespread legal acceptance,
especially when public opinion was still sharply divided over the
decision. 158
While this essentially boils down to simple application of stare decisis,
the situation is more delicate when dealing with politically charged
issues such as substantive due process.159
In his majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons,' 60 Justice Kennedy
buttressed his holding by finding that there was a national consensus
against imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.' In dissent,
Justice O'Connor argued that there was no national consensus. 16 2 In
analyzing the case according to evolving standards of decency, she and
Justice Kennedy evidently read the same statistics differently. Justice
Kennedy also brought international opinion into the analysis, which
involves a determination of popular preferences, but on a global scale.16 3
Justice O'Connor agreed that the Court may consider foreign and
international law and that there is a global consensus against imposing
capital punishment on juveniles.'6 But for Justice O'Connor,
consideration of national opinion should take precedence over
consideration of international opinion.165 Nevertheless, both Justice
Kennedy and Justice O'Connor clearly demonstrated their inclination to
heed public sentiment-at least in the Eighth Amendment context.
In cases like Planned Parenthood and Roper, "public confidence
considerations may serve as a limiting factor-barring the Court from a
certain course of action-or may be a prompting factor---calling upon
the Court to either withdraw from an erroneous precedent or revisit its
158. MARSHALL, supra note 988, at 12-13.
159. See 505 U.S. at 861 ("In a less significant case, stare decisis analysis could, and would,
stop at the point we have reached. But the sustained and widespread debate Roe has provoked calls
for some comparison between that case and others of comparable dimension.. . ."); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Partial-BirthAbortion and the Perils of ConstitutionalCommon Law, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 519, 549 (2008) ("[T]he plurality concluded that overruling Roe would upset important
reliance interests, and therefore preserved its core holding while modifying or rejecting certain
peripheral rules (for example, those regarding waiting periods) to strike a better social policy
balance.").
160. 543 U.S. 551, 564-67 (2005).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 578.
164. Id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. See id.
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interpretation in light of new public perceptions and attitudes." 66 In
Planned Parenthood, public opinion considerations operated in
conjunction with stare decisis to preserve the fundamentals of Roe; while
in Roper, an emerging national and international consensus prompted the
Court to abandon its holding in Stanford v. Kentucky.167
IV. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SWING JUSTICE

Public opinion affects all of the Supreme Court Justices by varying
degrees. But popular sentiment more substantially impacts swing
Justices, who wield enormous leverage in divisive cases.' 68 A "swing"
Justice has been described as a Justice who "'mov[es] between the
liberal and conservative factions."'l 6 9 He or she is likely "to resolve [a]
case on narrower, more minimalist grounds." 70 Moreover, swing
Justices often author concurring opinions, which "have sometimes
exercised a greater impact on subsequent case law than the majority
opinions they accompanied."'71 Prominent swing Justices of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries include Justices Powell, 172

O'Connor,173 and Kennedy.174
166. Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft,Its Public Perception, and the
Role of the Scholar, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2007) ("Taking as a given that if perceived as
exercised illegitimately, judicial authority in a democracy stands to depreciate, and that legitimacy,
at least in part, is a function of public confidence, it is not surprising that judges directly address the
issue of maintaining public confidence."). Reichman cites Bush v. Gore as another example of the
Court addressing public confidence issues. Id.
167. Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 84546(1992).
168. William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. OF POL. 169, 179 (1996)
("Moderate justices are of special concern not only because they are more likely to change their
attitudes or adjust their votes in response to political exigencies, but also because they occupy
critical positions on the Court.... [W]hen centrist attitudes do change, the consequences for the
Court are likely to be greater.").
169. Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The
Impact ofJustice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 392 n.99 (1999) (citation omitted).
170. Peter B. Rutledge, Looking Ahead: October2006, 2005-06 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 361, 364-

65 (2006).
171. Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race Preference
Policies,63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 385, 416-17 (2008).
172.

See generally JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (Charles Scribner's

Sons 1994) (accounting the life and jurisprudence of Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, who
served on the bench from 1972 to 1987).
173. See generally JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON
THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE (2005) (accounting the life and
jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, who served on the bench from 1981 to 2006).
174. See Lisa K. Parshall, Embracingthe Living Constitution:Justice Anthony M Kennedy's
Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of ConstitutionalInterpretation,30 N.C. CENT. L.J.
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A. Studies Suggest Swing Justices Are More Inclinedto Heed
Public Opinion than Brethren
Several studies indicate that in the context of judicial decision
making, public opinion affects swing Justices more acutely than their
brethren. 175 One scholar posits that "justices with relatively more intense
or firmly held ideologies should be less susceptible to the influence of
public opinion than Justices whose attitudes or ideologies are less
intense." 7 Thus, Justices with moderate views-swing Justices-are
more likely to respond to public opinion because they are not firmly
attached to either a conservative or liberal predilection. 7 7 Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, for example, lacked definitive judicial
preferences and "embraced doctrinal formulas that allowed them to take
into account elite opinion, elected government pressures, and the desires
of the American people."' 7 8
Justice O'Connor's performance during her early years on the
Court suggested she would be a reliable conservative.179 But her
allegiance to the conservative cause waned after Justice Powell retired
from the Court.180 Her shift in judicial philosophy suggests that a swing
Justice is often the product of the times, created by external factors and
not necessarily by a clearly defined jurisprudence.' 8 1 One of those
external factors is the transformation of the core makeup of the
25, 35-65 (2007) (explaining the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy); see generally Parshall,supra
note 124 (outlining the development of Justice Kennedy's substantive due process jurisprudence).
175. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges-Except All the Others
That Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REv. 267, 272 (2005) ("Studies indicate, though
inconclusively, that the appointed Justices on the Supreme Court, and in particular the swing
Justices, are affected by public opinion, though they certainly have little financial reason to placate
the public.").
176. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 168, at 178.
177. Id. at 178-79.
178. Devins, supra note 66, at 1061-62; see also Merrill, supra note 64, at 629-30 (suggesting
that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are more sensitive to external forces than the other Justices).
"Political scientists have also theorized that moderate Justices are more likely to be influenced by
changes in public opinion and have developed statistical tests tending to support this proposition."
Id.
179. See GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 124. Justice O'Connor was committed to the
Republican Party, becoming active in Arizona state politics as a legislator and later as a state judge.
Id. at 11-12.
180. See BISKUPIC, supra note 173, at 181-82 ("Powell had set the equilibrium: he had cast the
key vote and written the opinion in the seminal Bakke case that allowed affirmative action in higher
education. He was the decisive vote for the death penalty but with safeguards. By the time he
retired, he seemed to be the fifth justice keeping abortion rights in place.").
181. See GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 217 ("The shifting dynamics of the institution affected
[O'Connor] and pushed her to the middle, with fellow centrist Kennedy. The two were moderates
partly because both were pragmatic and approached each case on its own.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/11

26

Wilhelm: Giving Public Opinion the Process That is Due: What the Supreme C

2009]

GIVING PUBLIC OPINION DUE PROCESS

393

Republican Party, which changed dramatically in the aftermath of
Roe.182 justices O'Connor and Kennedy "were perhaps the last
representatives of an older, country club Republicanism, keenly
interested in keeping the size of the national government down and
limiting government regulation of businesses, but not all that interested
in the social issues that animated the core constituencies of the modem
Republican Party."' 83 This disenchantment with the Republican Party
arguably led to the development of their centrist approaches to
constitutional analysis since they could no longer relate to the
conservative agenda and had never been staunchly liberal.18 4
Consequently, it is clear that the politicization of the Court, heralded by
the outcry over Roe, shaped the role of the modem swing Justice.
1. Effect of Public Opinion on Justice Powell
Justice Powell was less in tune with public opinion than Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy.185 In his expansive analysis, Marshall ranked
the fourteen Rehnquist Court Justices in order of their overall agreement
with public opinion.186 Justice Powell tied for ninth on that list with
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, while Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
ranked fourth and sixth, respectively.' 87 Even though Justice Powell was
often the fifth vote in divisive cases, he probably did not consider
himself a factor in the politicization of the Court.' 88 He shied away from
politics, later pointing to the failed Robert Bork nomination as evidence
of the danger of mixing politics with the judicial appointment process.189
182. TUSHNET, supra note 30, at 69-70.
183. Id. at 70; see also Merrill, supra note 64, at 576 (arguing that "the failed nomination of
Robert Bork, the barely successful nomination of Clarence Thomas, and the adoption of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 revealed intense opposition to the conservative agenda on abortion, other
privacy issues, and issues of race and gender discrimination"). Merrill asserts that "[tihis
demonstration of hostile public opinion may have been enough to persuade the Court--or more
accurately, its three moderate conservatives-either to abandon the conservative coalition altogether
(Souter), or at least to steer clear of controversial rulings on social issues as much as possible
(O'Connor and Kennedy)." Id.
184. See TUSHNET, supra note 30, at 70.
185. MARSHALL,supra note 98, at 78 tbl.5.1.
186. Id.
187. Id. Note that this ranking is limited to the Rehnquist Court era and does not take into
account how often Justice Kennedy has been in accord with public opinion during the Roberts
Court. Id. Also, note that this ranking demonstrates how on average the Justices have agreed with
public opinion; it does not chronicle that agreement over the course of their respective tenures. Over
the course of her Supreme Court career, Justice O'Connor shifted from a conservative to a more
centrist approach. See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text. It is conceivable, then, that she
agreed with public opinion more often during her later years on the bench.
188. JEFFRIES, supra note 172, at 554.
189. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 11

394

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:367

will think
"'I am concerned,' he wrote privately, 'that many in the public
90
institution."'l
political
another
simply
is
Court
the Supreme
It has been suggested that Justice Powell believed the Court should
shape, rather than reflect, public opinion. For example, he signed onto
the majority opinion in Roe to "anticipate popular sentiment .... By
leaping over the current legislative muddle, the Court would achievequickly, cleanly, and without wrenching divisions-the solution toward
which the country as a whole was clearly aimed."' 9 ' But as Justice
Powell grew in experience, his judicial outlook leaned toward a
"presumption in favor of legislative acts, a sense of deference to popular
choices."' 92 Justice Thurgood Marshall charged that, in deciding
Milliken v. Bradley,193 for which Powell provided the fifth vote, "his
colleagues had given in to the strident public opposition to busing."' 9 4
Contrary to Justice Marshall's accusation, Justice Powell's role as
swing Justice was not characterized by the same level of adherence to
public opinion as later swing Justices.195 Perhaps one reason Powell was
not as affected by public opinion in this role was because he was not the
product of the same politicization as were Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. After all, he joined the Court before Roe, and left soon after
the Bork nomination, which marked a turning point in the questioning of
judicial nominees. 96

190. Id ("What appalled Powell in the debates over Robert Bork was not that the nominee
might lose, but that the Supreme Court might be tarnished.... Powell deplored the role of the
'special interest groups,' the use against a judicial nominee of the 'massive media and mail
campaigning that goes on in presidential elections,' and the 'racial bloc voting' that doomed Bork in
the South." (citations omitted)).
191. Id. at 352.
192. Id. at 425. He eventually loosened his commitment to judicial restraint, a principle he had
modeled after Justice John Harlan. Id "The principle [of judicial restraint] declined into an
attitude-not a rigid ban on judicial innovation, but a presumption in favor of legislative acts, a
sense of deference to popular choices and values, and an habitual hesitation to substitute his own
views and inclinations." Id Moreover, "Powell's ingrained courtesy and ability to listen also
underlay his most often remarked judicial attribute-an instinct for moderation and compromise.
Genuine respect for the views of others directs the mind toward the common ground." Id. at 561.
193. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (holding that Brown did not justify the busing of public school
students across district lines in Detroit).
194. JEFFRIES, supra note 172, at 315. Justice Marshall noted that he did not mean that the
Justices necessarily followed public opinion polls. Id. at 316.
195. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
196. Justice Powell joined the bench in 1972 and retired in 1987. See JEFFRIES, supra note 172,
at 242, 544.
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2. Effect of Public Opinion on Justice O'Connor
During the course of her Supreme Court career, "O'Connor had
become the justice to watch.... With the Court divided 4-4 on critical
issues, her vote often determined the outcome of important cases.
Lawyers crafted their arguments to appeal especially to her, knowing
that as O'Connor went, so went the Court."' 9 7 Ultimately, "[flew
associate Justices in history dominated a time so thoroughly or cast as
many deciding votes as O'Connor-on important issues ranging from
abortion to affirmative action, from executive war powers to the election
of a president."09 Learning from her experience as a state legislator, she
"developed an incremental approach, taking her cues from the country
and pushing it ever so slightly. She would neither drive the culture of the
nation, nor seriously upset it." 99 By often providing the fifth vote and
writing concurring opinions that served to limit the majority's holding,
Justice O'Connor succeeded in shaping many politically divisive
200
decisions.
The politicization of the judicial appointment process and the more
pronounced ideological split among the Justices unsettled Justice
O'Connor. 20 1 As the executive and legislative branches fought over
judicial appointments and produced polarizing nominees, Justice
O'Connor escaped the political brouhaha and looked outside the fray to
decide constitutional questions. "She saw herself as a balanced person
who offered the reasonable compromise in important cases."202 Her
''cautious instincts . . . were remarkably similar to those of the American
people."20 3 In fact, "s]he had an uncanny ear for American public
opinion, and she kept her rulings closely tethered to what most people
wanted or at least would accept."204 Of course, her votes were not one
197. GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 20.
198. TooBIN, supra note 24, at 7.
199. BISKUPIC, supra note 173, at 334 ("O'Connor arrived in Washington knowing how to
count votes. The divided Court-and divided, polarized nation-played to her strength as a
consensus builder and gave her a way to be 'constructive,' as she might say. Once she found the
middle, she never left it.").
200. See, e.g., GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 44 (noting that Justice O'Connor "had a
'troublesome propensity to file concurring opinions seeking to dilute the force of opinions
condemning' racial quotas").
201. Id. at 122 ("With Brennan and Marshall gone, the liberals lacked a voice to define their
position. Thomas's insistent arguments, and Scalia's ready acquiescence, appeared to be shifting the
Court's focus forcefully to the right... . [W]hen the balance of the Court began to shift to the right,
O'Connor's line of compromise changed.").
202. Id.
203. TOOBIN, supra note 24, at 2. Toobin argues that "for O'Connor there was little difference
between a judicial and a political philosophy." Id. at 7.
204. Id.
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hundred percent on par with public opinion.205 A particularly
controversial blight on her record was Bush v. Gore: "[O'Connor] had
continually shown an awareness of the public response to the Court as an
institution. In her opinions, she typically explained why the Court ruled
as it did.

. ..

Now, in the most controversial case of her tenure, she said

nothing. She explained nothing., 20 6 But overall, Justice O'Connor
reliably played the swing role on the Court, passing that mantle to
Justice Kennedy when she retired in early 2006. "Months after
O'Connor had left the Court for good, Kennedy said he found himself
missing her.

. .

. Kennedy had become the lone moderate, the Justice

who sided with the conservatives sometimes and liberals others."20 7
3. Effect of Public Opinion on Justice Kennedy
Since Justice O'Connor retired from the Court, Justice Kennedy has
played the role of swing Justice. "In a great majority of the ideologically
charged cases that reach the court, the crucial swing vote belongs to
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy ... [who] 'may in fact be closest to the
median national voter."' 208 Justice Kennedy's analytical method has
been described as a "middle-of-the-road, split-the-difference approach to
deciding cases,, 2 09 and his jurisprudence reflects "sensitivity to evolving
social trends," as evidenced by his refusal to overturn Roe and his
defense of gay rights in Lawrence v. Texas.210 Justice Kennedy generally
does not appear comfortable in either the conservative or liberal
camps. 211 In fact, he "spent his first term trying to straddle the divide
between the Court's two blocs-especially on the divisive abortion and
civil rights
cases. ,,212
The political fallout from Bush v. Gore, as well as Justice
Kennedy's extensive travels and exposure to foreign and international
law, have been credited with "transform[ing]" Justice Kennedy's judicial
philosophy.2 13 Justice Kennedy is a man very much aware of his public
persona and concerned with his legacy.2 14 Justice Kennedy's

205. See MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 78 tbl.5.1.
206. BISKUPIC, supra note 173, at 313.
207.

GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 217.

208. Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift or Shove the Court Left, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at
WKl.
209. GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 85.
210. See Parshall,supra note 124, at 238-43.
211. See GREENBURG, supra note 21, at 85.
212. Id.
213. TOOBIN, supra note 24, at 182.
214. TUSHNET, supra note 30, at 176.
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performance on the Court after the addition of two assuredly
conservative Justices proves that he is not openly wedded to the
Republican cause. One-third of the cases handed down in 2006 and 2007
"were decided by votes of 5-4-a level of division unprecedented in the
Court's recent history." 2 15 Of those twenty-four cases decided by a fiveto-four vote, "Kennedy was in the majority in every single one. ,,2 16
V. INCORPORATING PUBLIC OPINION INTO
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS

The Founding Fathers never contemplated a two-party system, but
such a system nevertheless emerged, ineluctably defining the nature of
American governance.217 While this story begins with the executive and
legislative branches, it does not end there. "Except for short-lived
transitional periods when the old [political] alliance is disintegrating and
the new one is struggling to take control of political institutions, the
Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national alliance." 2 18
Although the Court might not be "an agent of the alliance," 2 19 it
typically does not steer too far from the major policies of the party in
power. 22 0 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court considers such political
factors as public opinion. In fact, "it is an essential characteristic of the
institution that from time to time its members decide cases where legal
criteria are not in any realistic sense adequate to the task." 2 2 1
The area of constitutional law where the Court most often takes
public opinion into account is in criminal cases. 222 In Weems v. United

215. TOOBIN, supra note 24, at 331.
216. Id. at 333.
217. See Dahl, supra note 114, at 293 ("National politics in the United States ... is dominated
by relatively cohesive alliances that endure for long periods of time. One recalls the Jeffersonian
alliance, the Jacksonian, the extraordinarily long-lived Republican dominance of the post-Civil War
years, and the New Deal alliance shaped by Franklin Roosevelt. Each is marked by a break with
past policies, a period of intense struggle, followed by consolidation, and finally decay and
disintegration of the alliance.").
218. Id.
219. Id. "The Supreme Court is not, however, simply an agent of the alliance. It is an essential
part of the political leadership and possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of
which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution," which would be
threatened were the Court to steer too far from the major policies of the dominant alliance. Id.
220. Id at 293-94.
221. Id.at280.
222. See MARSHALL, supra note 98, at 8; see also Roesch, supra note 73, at 401 (noting that
the Court's Eighth Amendment cases have long been in line with public opinion).
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States,22 3 "the Court acknowledged the value of 'progressive,'
'enlightened' public opinion" 224 in interpreting "cruel and unusual
punishment." 22 5 That acknowledgment "opened the door for [the]
'evolving standards of decency' approach" adopted in Trop v. Dulles.2 2 6
There, the Court noted that the nature of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence requires more than a cursory examination of the plain
language of the Constitution or a historical perspective.227 Because the
Amendment is ambiguous, 2 28 the Court held that cases and controversies
arising under that Amendment must be decided based on "evolving
standards of decency." 22 9 Therefore, when the Court determines whether
a particular punishment is cruel and unusual, it analyzes how public
opinion has evolved regarding that punishment. The less socially
acceptable a punishment, the more likely it is to be struck down.
Cases involving the interpretation and application of ambiguous
constitutional language like "cruel and unusual punishment" are
"political" in nature.230 Such cases typically "involve alternatives about
which there is severe disagreement in the society, as in the case of
segregation." 23 1 The situation is compounded by the fact that precedent

223. 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (holding that the provision forbidding cruel and unusual
punishment in the Philippine Bill of Rights must be interpreted in accordance with the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
224. Brian W. Varland, Marking the Progress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the
Constitutionality of Death Penalty Application in Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28
HAMLINE L. REv. 311, 316 (2005) (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (noting that the Eighth
Amendment is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice")).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
226. Varland, supra note 224, at 316 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
227. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-101.
228. Id. at 100-01 ("[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and ... their
scope is not static."); see also Roesch, supra note 73, at 401 ("The terms cruel and unusual are
inherently subjective. Nor is there sufficient evidence of the Framers' intent in using those words to
be useful in giving substance to the Amendment. As a result, the Court has considered public
opinion in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual." (citations omitted)).
229. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 ("The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
230. Dahl, supranote 114, at 280. Dahl explains that these "are usually cases where competent
students of constitutional law, including the learned justices of the Supreme Court themselves,
disagree; where the words of the Constitution are general, vague, ambiguous, or not clearly
applicable." Id.
231. Id. Dahl argues that "the Court is a national policy-maker" and "cannot act strictly as a
legal institution." Id. at 281. Instead, the Court "must ... choose among controversial alternatives of
public policy by appealing to at least some criteria of acceptability on questions of fact and value
that cannot be found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution." Id.
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and expert opinion support both sides of controversial issues.2 32
Consideration of a political issue does not, however, mandate a political
solution. The Court should base its decisions on constitutionally defined
standards and not on mere determinations of public opinion, especially
when deciding divisive Fourteenth Amendment cases. In Eighth
Amendment

cases,

the

Court

"use[s] . . . public

opinion

to give

substance to a standard by which a practice . .. is legally assessed." 2 33
The Court determines whether a punishment is cruel and unusual
according to evolving standards of decency. But in the Fourteenth
Amendment context, the Court invokes public opinion "'in order to
decide the legal status of a particular practice."' 23 4 The Court does not
examine public opinion according to a particular standard. Reliance on
evolving standards of decency in Eighth Amendment analysis is
constitutionally delineated.235 Incorporation of public opinion into
Fourteenth Amendment analysis lacks a comparable constitutional hook.
A. Problems with Relying on Public Opinion in General
Judicial reliance on public opinion is risky, due largely to
institutional needs of the three branches of government, unreliable
polling data, an ill-defined methodology, and political turnover. Most
significantly, the Supreme Court's use of public opinion undermines the
precedential value of its decisions, which causes problems for lower
courts and the public.
The questionable tenability of public opinion as a factor in judicial
decision making raises legitimate stare decisis concerns. The Court
upends sacrosanct legal norms by inserting itself into the political
process and not formulating a sound legal doctrine for lower courts to
follow. Assuming that the Court should play a role in social policy
making and that "judicial review of legislation is viewed as a tool of
social engineering," 236 then "stare decisis is essential if courts are to
have a maximum impact in achieving social reforms."237 One noted
example is the application of Brown v. Board of Education. While "the
resolution of a single case does little to advance far-reaching goals such
232. Id. at 280.
233. Roesch, supra note 73, at 413 (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 412 (quoting Wojciech Sadurski, ConventionalMorality and JudicialStandards, 73
VA. L. REv. 339, 353 (1987)). "Examples include the legality of abortion and euthanasia." Id.
235. See supranotes 223-29 and accompanying text.
236. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement,93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 305 (1979).

237. Id.
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as racial integration, . . . . in order to implement [ambitious] social
programs ... the Court must be able to commit the lower courts and
later Supreme Courts to a course of action."23 8 This is impossible when
the Court structures its reasoning-even partly-on shaky legal ground.
A concern arises that "recalcitrant individuals will evade the ruling in
the hope that by the time they are brought into court, the law will have
changed." 2 39 Or, in this case, the concern is that public opinion will have
changed. "Anything that serves to weaken the force of
precedent .. . threatens both judicial power generally and the power to
implement constitutional norms specifically." 2 40
Furthermore, judicial invocation of public opinion threatens
constitutionally inviolable principles like separation of powers and
checks and balances. The Constitution commits to Congress the
authority to make the law, to the executive the duty to enforce the law,
and to the judiciary the power to interpret the law. 24' But the
Constitution does not clearly define inter-branch boundaries, 242 making
it possible, and perhaps inevitable, that one branch will impinge upon
another's authority. For example, the Warren Court forever altered our
social landscape by engaging in equal protection and criminal rights
issues in the face of congressional inaction.2 43 However, just as
congressmen should be wary of undertaking judicial functions, 24 the
Court needs to strike a careful balance between legal policy making and
judicial overreaching:
[W]hat you have [now] is the court undoing precedent in such a way as
to really shake the foundations. And I think that's not good for the
Supreme Court.
Let the legislative branch, let even the executive branch, be the ones
who reflect public opinion. But they're making opinion. They're

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. U.S. CONST. arts. 1,11 & Ill.
242. See id. (illustrating the absence of any precisely stated inter-branch boundaries).
243. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (holding that accused persons
must be apprised of their "right to remain silent"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (declaring "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
244. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979) ("[Legislatures] are not ideologically committed or institutionally suited
to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see their primary function in terms of
registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people-what they want and what they believe
should be done.").
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making law rather than holding fast to what we've understood to be
laws in these United States.
To me, that's shaking our constitutional government to the ground. 245
Invocation of public opinion also presents logistical concerns.
While polls are arguably a reliable indicator of popular sentiment,246
they are handicapped by certain quirks that lessen their value.247 For
example, polling results can vary according to even slight changes in the
wording of questions.248 More generally, "[e]verything from variations
in the survey methodology, such as the choice of the target population,
the sampling design used, the questions asked, and the statistical
analyses used to interpret the data can skew the results." 24 9 Other
problems include people not knowing much about the issues relevant to
legal policy and respondents structuring their answers so they do not
reflect badly. on themselves. 25 0 No less significant is the potential for
bias-"imagine the public outcry if the Court cited a Fox News poll and
ignored a competing CNN poll reaching a different conclusion., 2 5 1
Moreover, the Court has not fashioned a would-be instruction
manual for lower courts on how and when to factor public opinion into
their constitutional analysis. The Justices addressed the subject at length
during oral argument for Atkins, questioning counsel on the appropriate
mechanisms for measuring popular sentiment.2 52 When counsel for
petitioner argued that there was a consensus against the execution of the
mentally retarded, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked, "What is your

245. Fox News Sunday Roundtable (Fox News Network television broadcast July 1, 2007)
(transcript on file with the Hofstra Law Review); see also Dahl, supra note 114, at 280 (arguing that
"accept[ing] the Court as a political institution would solve one set of problems at the price of
creating another").
246. See Roesch, supranote 73, at 381.
247. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1351
(2001).
248. See id.
249. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 326 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
250. See Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 247, at 1351 n.946. But see Marshall, supranote 66, at
23 ("Pollsters frequently write poll items to tap issues in Supreme Court disputes. Major nationwide
polls also routinely report, or at least archive, poll results ... for major demographic groups.").
Marshall argues that it is possible to rely on poll results to determine whose attitudes the Court best
represents. Id.
251. Wayne Myers, Supreme Court Review: Roper v. Simmons: The Collision of National
2 8
Consensus and Proportionality Review, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 947, 981 n. 5 (2006)
("[T]he Court has no unique sensory apparatus enabling it to make conclusive judgments regarding
the accuracy and impartiality of polls and other fluid measurements of public opinion.").
252. Oyez: U.S. Supreme Court Media, Atkins v. Virginia (No. 00-8452)-ral Argument,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001-00-8452/argument/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
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definition of a consensus?" 25 3 Counsel fumbled through his response, but
as the discussion progressed and other Justices interjected with
questions, a potential solution emerged:
[QUESTION:] You're not talking about polls if you're talking about
public sentiment, are you?
MR. ELLIS: It seems to me, Your Honor, that ... the polling
information, which was quite scanty then and is now quite full ... is

part of the picture.
[QUESTION:] Well, wouldn't you expect if people feel that way, it
would-it would be manifested in legislation?
MR. ELLIS: And increasingly it is.
[QUESTION:] Yes, but are you saying that somehow polls are to be
considered in addition to legislation?
MR. ELLIS: Polls, it seems to me, Your Honor are a way
of. . . viewing the legislation, of seeing whether or not the consensus
the legislation appears to reveal is in fact ... 254
Accordingly, the Court incorporated polling data and evidence of state
legislative action into its majority opinion.2 55 Chief Justice Rehnquist in
dissent took offense to the majority's use of polling data.256
A similar invocation of societal trends and public consensus in
Lawrence v. Texas partly justifies Chief Justice Rehnquist's indignation.
In that case, Justice Kennedy notes "an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 2 57 To support this
assertion, his opinion chronicles the history of state sodomy laws and
references favorable international treatment of gay rights.25 8 It should be
noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist's Atkins dissent and the Atkins
majority agree that the Court can rely on state legislative action in
determining public opinion.259 But Lawrence neither piggybacks on
26 0
Atkins nor imparts a discernable precedent for lower courts to follow.
253. Id
254. Id
255. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15, 316 n.21 (2002).
256. Id. at 325-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
257. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
258. Id. at 568-77.
259. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15, 322-23.
260. The majority in Lawrence does not cite Atkins v. Virginia in its discussion of societal
trends. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-77.
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"Lawrence has sparked numerous questions and a heated debate.... [It]
sharply draws into question the appropriate methodology to be used in
adjudicating substantive due process claims." 2 6 1
Membership change on the Court can also pose problems. The
262
average American President appoints two Justices per term.
"Presidents are not famous for appointing Justices hostile to their own
views on public policy nor could they expect to secure confirmation of a
man whose stance on key questions was flagrantly at odds with that of
the dominant majority in the Senate."2 63 Consequently, the values of the
Justices are likely to reflect those of the political party in power. So not
only is the Court more reliant on public opinion, but it is also more
vulnerable to election outcomes and unpredictable shifts in public
opinion over the course of congressional and presidential
administrations.2 6 Conservative Justices appointed by conservative
presidents, and liberal Justices appointed by liberal presidents, arguably
will not waver in their analysis.265 But moderate swing Justices put off
by judicial politicking might respond to this shift. It will be interesting to
see whether Justice Sotomayor will be reliably liberal or whether she
will follow in Justices O'Connor's or Kennedy's footsteps.
B. IncorporatingPublic Opinion into Equal ProtectionCases
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State can "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 266
But what happens when the Court's interpretation of this Clause results
in unequal treatment? That is the danger when the judiciary follows
public opinion in equal protection cases-the result is unequal treatment
that might not be apparent in a specific case, but that instead manifests
over a period of time involving multiple cases. Take the Court's
desegregation, integration, and affirmative action decisions.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,26 7 the
Court approved the use of busing "to eliminate from the public schools
all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 2 68 Then, three years later, the
261. Parshall, supra note 124, at 250-51.
262. See Dahl, supra note 114, at 284.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 284-85.
265. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
266. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
267. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
268. Id. at 15. "In these circumstances, we find no basis for holding that the local school
authorities may not be required to employ bus transportation as one tool of school desegregation."
Id. at 30.
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Court limited the reach of Swann in Milliken v. Bradley,269 holding that
Brown did not justify the busing of public school students across fiftythree district lines in Detroit absent evidence of dejure segregation.27 0 In
dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall observed, "[tioday's holding, I fear,
is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far
enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it
is the product of neutral principles of law." 2 7 1 Indeed, a Gallup poll
conducted before the Court decided Milliken found that "only 9 percent
of blacks and 4 percent of whites favored busing children outside of their
own neighborhoods."272
In Grutter v. Bollinger,273 the Court, in a five-to-four decision,
upheld the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action
program, finding that "the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the
Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to
further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body." 27 4 Just four years later-after two
new Justices had joined the bench 275-the Court proscribed public
school assignment plans designed to achieve racial integration and found
that racial balancing is not a compelling state interest. 27 6 Justice Stephen
G. Breyer penned a powerful dissent in ParentsInvolved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 denouncing the plurality's approach as "legally
unsound" 277 and warned of dire consequences:
Yesterday, the plans under review were lawful. Today, they are not.
Yesterday, the citizens of this Nation could look for guidance to this
Court's unanimous pronouncements concerning desegregation. Today,
they cannot. Yesterday, school boards had available to them a full
range of means to combat segregated schools. Today, they do not.278

269. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
270. Id. at 745.
271. Id. at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
272. DAVID FRUM, How WE GOT HERE: THE 70'S: THE DECADE THAT BROUGHT YOU
MODERN LIFE (FOR BETTER OR WORSE) 253 (2000).

273. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
274. Id. at 343.
275. Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court in 2005, and Justice Alito joined in 2006. See The
Oyez Project, John G. Roberts, Jr., http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_robertsjr (last visited Mar.
31, 2010); The Oyez Project, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., http://www.oyez.org/justices/samuel-a-alitojr
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
276. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730-31 (2007).
277. Id. at 858.
278. Id at 865-66; see also Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved
Right: A 5-4 Dynamic, With Kennedy as Linchpin, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al ("It was that
decision that prompted Justice Breyer's highly unusual declaration from the bench . . . 'It is not
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Justice Breyer considered the Court's decision politically driven,2 79 a
charge supported by the conservative make-up of the bench and polling
data.280
Justice Breyer argued that ParentsInvolved in Community Schools
departed significantly from earlier desegregation cases, including
Brown.281 He characterized the Court's holding as judicial overreaching, listing numerous consequences that could spring from that
decision. 282 He chastised the plurality:
[A]s a judge, I do know that the Constitution does not authorize judges
to dictate solutions to these problems. Rather, the Constitution creates
a democratic political system through which the people themselves
must together find answers. And it is for them to debate how best to
educate the Nation's children and how best to administer America's
schools to achieve that aim. The Court should leave them to their
work.283
Justice Breyer's point here essentially boils down to a classic federalism
and separation of powers argument, a la James Madison.284
Madison argued that "[i]t is of great importance . . . to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure. ,,285 Madison's theory "was that although at a local level one
'faction' might well have sufficient clout to be able to tyrannize others,
in the national government no faction or interest group would constitute
a majority capable of exercising control." 286 But Madison did not factor

often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much."' (quoting Oral Opinion of Justice
Breyer at 19:53, 32:54-33:01, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion)).
279. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
280. See Lydia Saad, Black-White Educational Opportunities Widely Seen as Equal, GALLUP,
July 2, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/28021/BlackWhite-Educational-Opportunities-WidelySeen-Equal.aspx (asking Americans, "In general, do you think that black children have as good a
chance as white children in your community to get a good education, or don't you think they have
as good a chance?"). Three-quarters of Americans believe that black children do have an equal
opportunity to get a good education. Id. While the poll did not specifically address the issue in
ParentsInvolved in Community Schools, it "can provide some clues about how the decision is being
perceived." Id.
281. 551 U.S. at 857-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 858-63.
283. Id. at 862.
284. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 253-55 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
285. Id. at 254.
286. Ely, supra note 95, at 460.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 11

406

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:367

the two-party political system or the politicization of the Court into his
analysis. 2 87 The incidental liberal-conservative split of the modem Court
and its reliance on "majority" public opinion runs afoul of core
constitutional principles.
Politicians all too often are distracted by lobbyists and moneyed
interests. In fact, "there may be political pressures to encourage our
representatives to pass laws that treat the majority coalition on whose
continued support they depend in one way, and one or more minorities
they feel they do not need in a less favorable way."288 Justice Robert H.
Jackson once opined that "nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so
effectively as to allow. .. officials to pick and choose only a few to
whom they will apply legislation ... . Courts can take no better measure
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
operation." 2 8 9 The brilliance of the American system of checks and
balances is that the Court can overturn discriminatory laws. The Court
should protect minorities from majority rule even when the public favors
discrimination. 2 90 Countermajoritarian principles cannot be achieved by
blind allegiance to party politics and public opinion, especially when
lower courts are left without clear precedent to follow. The only way to
ensure that the laws are equal in operation is to apply them equally.
Haphazard invocation of public opinion is not an option.
C. IncorporatingPublic Opinion into Substantive Due Process Cases
In adhering to, alluding to, or even considering, public opinion, the
Court has been inconsistent with its approach to privacy lawparticularly regarding abortion. "It has instituted vague, arbitrary, and
inconsistent standards for abortion legislation, and then changed them,
repeatedly, in more than twenty-seven cases over thirty-three years. 91291
The Court first recognized an individual right to privacy in a landmark

287. The first official political parties arose after the federal Constitution was written and
ratified. See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 310, 320, 327, 336 (1990).

288. Ely, supra note 95, at 458.
289. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
290. See, e.g., Gail L. Heriot, Strict Scrutiny, Public Opinion, and Affirmative Action on
Campus: Should the Courts Find a Narrowly Tailored Solution to a Compelling Need in a Policy
Most Americans Oppose?, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 222 (2003) ("It is established that the
Supreme Court owes no deference to legislatures or other lawmaking authorities when it reviews
racially discriminatory laws. It owes even less deference to public support for such laws." (citation
omitted)).
291. Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why
Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 91-92 (2005).
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decision striking down a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of
contraceptives. 2 92 "Griswold [v. Connecticut] is a classic example of the
Warren Court's penchant for reaching a result deemed fair (and sensible
to most Americans), then trying to find some constitutional justification
for it." 2 9 3 Subsequent decisions asserting a right to privacy-beginning
with Roe-accelerated the politicization of judicial appointments and
magnified the ideological split among the Justices that spilled over into
their decision making.294 While both the liberal and conservative
coalitions are arguably guilty of cherry-picking results, it is the swing
Justice's perception of the political landscape that most severely
muddies the Court's substantive due process analysis. 295
Justice Antonin Scalia once observed that "[t]he picking and
choosing among various rights to be accorded 'substantive due process'
protection is alone enough to arouse suspicion ... 296 There, Justice
Scalia was referring to the retroactive application of a tax statute,297 but
his remarks are equally applicable in the right to privacy context.298
Stenberg v. Carhart,2 99 striking down a Nebraska law that criminalized
partial-birth abortion without providing a health exception,3 00 and
Gonzales v. Carhart,30' upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act
of 2003,302 are textbook examples. Both Stenberg and Gonzales were
five-to-four decisions: Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote in

292. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
293. Pushaw, supra note 159, at 531. ("Justice Douglas's 'penumbral' reasoning was so
transparently fictional that it generated widespread ridicule, and Justice Goldberg's analysis
similarly turned the Ninth Amendment on its head. Not surprisingly, these constitutional rationales
were swiftly abandoned. Nonetheless, the right to privacy endured. . . ." (citations omitted)).
294. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part IV.
296. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Dahl,
supra note 114, at 291 ("[I]n an earlier day it was perhaps easier to believe that certain rights are so
natural and self-evident that their fundamental validity is as much a matter of definite knowledge, at
least to all reasonable creatures, as the color of a ripe apple.").
297. Carton, 512 U.S. at 27.
298. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 159, at 549 ("[T]he [Casey] plurality may well have
captured the position of the crucial bloc of middle-of-the-road Americans: allow laws that express
moral concerns about abortion by discouraging it and by ensuring that pregnant women weigh their
options carefully and with full information, but ultimately leave the decision to each woman.").
299. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
300. Id. at 929-30.
301. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
302. Id. at 132-33.
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Stenberg while Justice Kennedy, who dissented in the former case,30
authored the majority opinion in Gonzales.305
In Stenberg, Justice O'Connor noted in a concurring opinion that
several states had "enacted [partial-birth abortion] statutes more
narrowly tailored" than the Nebraska law, laying out a model for
Nebraska to follow. 306 Justice Kennedy countered in dissent that this is a
decision better left to the collective wisdom of state legislatures,
claiming that "the Court substitute[d] its own judgment for the judgment
of Nebraska and some 30 other States." 30 7 He also pointed out that "[t]he
State's constitutional authority is a vital means for citizens to address
these grave and serious issues, as they must if we are to progress in
knowledge and understanding and in the attainment of some degree of
consensus."30s Arguably, "the most telling aspect of Stenberg is that the
Justices issued eight separate opinions. This fragmentation reinforces the
conclusion that Stenberg, like all abortion cases, reflects the personal
views of the justices rather than any law rooted in the Constitution."3 09
While the Court struck down a state statute criminalizing partialbirth abortion in Stenberg, it upheld a similar federal statute in
Gonzales.310 Politics can explain this disparate treatment. A 2003 Gallup
poll found that two-thirds of Americans favored criminalizing partialbirth abortion." While the Gonzales Court did not explicitly rely on
public opinion, it is worth noting that this case was decided after Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito joined the bench. 3 12 "[B]ecause
judicial opinions about abortion reflect politics and ideology, the party
of the nominating President can be quite influential." 13 The Court likely
felt comfortable departing from Stenberg because the decision
"articulated the mainstream American view: allow women to choose
abortion in the early period of pregnancy, but recognize the
government's interest in expressing its citizens' moral condemnation of

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
2010).
312.
313.

See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 947.
See id. at 956.
See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 132.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 950 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 957 (Kennedy, I., dissenting).
Pushaw, supranote 159, at 557.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 132-33.
Gallup, Abortion, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/Abortion.aspx (last visited Mar. 31,
See supra note 276.
Pushaw, supra note 159, at 542.
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partial-birth abortion." 3 14 Such implicit adherence to public opinion
threatens the integrity of the Court and the soundness of substantive due
process doctrine just as much as overt reliance. Ultimately, "Gonzales
cannot easily be squared with Stenberg .... Justice Kennedy's attempts
to distinguish Stenberg were strained and unconvincing."
VI. CONCLUSION

That Supreme Court Justices will bring inherent biases to the bench
is a foregone conclusion. But in recent years such biases have become
more overtly political and have crept more forcibly into the Court's legal
analysis. Justices appointed post-Brown and post-Roe are byproducts of
the regrettable politicization of the judicial selection process. Pundits
and public officials all too often relegate Court opinions to political
fodder, essentially forcing the Justices to take stock of popular
sentiment, particularly in Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment cases. But
problems arise when the Court even partly justifies Fourteenth
Amendment decisions on its perception of public opinion. First, the
politicization of judicial decision making upends stare decisis and upsets
the separation of powers-principles entrenched in American
republicanism. Second, polling data is not consistently reliable,
especially when Americans are asked about complicated constitutional
issues that come before the Court. Third, the Court has not fashioned a
clear methodology for considering public opinion in Fourteenth
Amendment cases. Instead, its patchwork reasoning subverts judicial
integrity and muddles the political process. It is difficult for lower courts
to apply this hodgepodge of Supreme Court decisions to new liberty
claims. Finally, the party in power shapes the ideological composition of
the Court, tying the Justices' incorporation of public opinion to the
prevailing political wind and exaggerating the role of the swing Justice.
The optimum solution would be to take public opinion completely
out of the equation, but that does not comport with political reality.
Rather, the Court should establish a constitutional framework in
Fourteenth Amendment analysis comparable to the Eighth Amendment's
It would be more difficult to accuse
evolving standards of decency.

314. Id at 569-70; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text (suggesting that one reason
the Court heeds public opinion is to legitimize its decisions).
315. Pushaw, supranote 159, at 568.
316. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 133-45 (2006). Conkle argues that the Court should develop a national consensus standard in
substantive due process jurisprudence:
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the Justices of politicking if they could be held strictly accountable for
invoking public opinion. First, de-politicizing the Court's decision
making would restore judicial integrity and preserve the federal balance.
Second, the problem of unreliable polling data could be resolved by
keeping polls out of the legal framework entirely. As Justice Rehnquist
noted in his Atkins dissent, because polling data is unreliable, other
factors such as state legislative action would be more indicative of the
public mood.3 17 Third, lower courts would have one standard to apply
and would not issue incongruous decisions. Finally, the Court's
reasoning-at least with respect to public opinion-would not be
contingent upon election results, so the power of the swing Justice would
also be curtailed relative to other Court members.
Rebecca Wilhelm*

Although it does not provide a bright-line test, the requirement of a contemporary
national consensus does provide an objective standard that limits the Supreme Court's
discretion in a meaningful way. The Court's analysis of the consensus question is
directed to the specific issue at hand, and it depends mainly upon the Court's
examination of legislative enactments, legislative trends, and patterns of actual
enforcement or nonenforcement.
Id. at 138; see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 278 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting and
concurring in judgment) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment is "vague and imprecise" and
that it must be "interpreted by future generations in accordance with the vision and needs of those
generations").
317. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322-23, 325-28 (2002).
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